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The Role of the Commission
Secretary
David M. Grenville*
1. INTRODUCTION
Royal commissions of inquiry are generally set up to address an urgent
public concern that is almost certainly politically sensitive. The task that they
are given to do is not an easy one, and they are expected to deal with it
competently, economically and, above all, expeditiously. Inevitably, some
controversy will be generated by their activities as they operate under intense
public scrutiny. There are, in fact, two kinds of inquiries: one is the quasi-
judicial investigation which has as its purpose to establish the facts and to
determine whether any act was contrary to the law or the public interest, or in
the case of an accident, could amount to negligence; the other is the consulta-
tive inquiry which seeks the best informed opinion in a particular area of
public concern so that it may analyse the options and make policy recommen-
dations to government. The investigative and the consultative inquiry are
organized on rather different lines and operate in different ways. When one
commission combines both functions, as did the Royal Commission on the
Ocean Ranger Marine Disaster, it faces some interesting problems.
No two royal commissions are alike, but they do have more in common
than may be immediately apparent. It is not generally appreciated by the
public that a royal commission is an organization established solely for the
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purpose of conducting the inquiry and that it has a strictly limited life. A staff
must be recruited, offices found and equipped and a plan, a schedule and a
budget prepared before the commission can come to grips with the job it has
undertaken. In the circumstances, it would seem reasonable to expect that the
government which sets up a royal commission should, in the initial stage,
provide it with considerable practical assistance and advice. That such advice
and assistance is likely to be minimal is no doubt due to a proper concern that
the traditional independence of a royal commission be safeguarded.
Harry Wilson's admirable handbook, Commissions of Inquiry: A
Handbook on Operations,' is an essential reference and provides guidance on
policy and precedent, as well as on organization and structure. It does not,
however, attempt to deal with many of the special administrative problems
encountered by most commissions. As Wilson notes:
The chairman of a commission is the deputy head under the appropriate Minister
and as such is the chief executive of the commission. Under him, it is most
important that a well-qualified executive officer (whether called executive direc-
tor, executive secretary or by some other title) be appointed to assist the commis-
sioners and to guide the day-to-day operations of the commission.2
As anyone knows who has managed an enterprise, it is easier to analyse
the management process in the context of what had to be done and how it was
achieved, than to attempt a series of generalizations. I wrote a report at the
conclusion of the Ocean Ranger Inquiry which highlighted some of the
administrative problems encountered by that particular commission and the
solutions which we adopted. The report was written while events were still
very fresh in my mind in the hope that it would record a few useful hints to
others travelling the same road and that it would indicate areas in which more
might be done to facilitate, the work of future commissions. I have drawn
freely on that report to illustrate the role of one particular commission
secretary.
2. THE DISASTER
Early on the morning of February 15, 1982, the semi-submersible drilling
unit Ocean Ranger capsized and sank on the Grand Banks, 170 nautical miles
east of St. John's ... The entire 84-man crew was lost in this disaster. Of the 69
Canadian crew members, 56 were residents of Newfoundland and the shock
wave created by the loss was felt particularly throughout that province. In that
tightly-knit maritime community there were few who did not discover a link,
direct or indirect, to one of those lost in the tragedy. The inquiry by this Royal
1 H.A. Wilson, Commissions oflnquiry: A Handbook of Operations (Ottawa: Privy Council
Office, 1982).
2 Ibid. at 13.
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Commission is therefore of unusually deep concern to Newfoundlanders. It also
has important implications for the rest of Canada and for other maritime nations
engaged in the search for offshore oil and gas
This brief extract from the Commission's first report describes the situation
with which both levels of government were confronted.
A major marine disaster had occurred with heavy loss of life and the
majority of those who perished were Canadians, mostly Newfoundlanders.
The complications were that the rig, the largest of its kind in the world at the
time, was generally considered to be unsinkable; that it was a United States
registered vessel which sank in international waters while drilling for a
Canadian oil company; that the rig was operating under separate permits
issued to that company by the Government of Canada and the Government of
Newfoundland; and that the two governments were locked in dispute, at that
time, about which of them had jurisdiction over offshore hydrocarbon
resources. A year earlier, another semi-submersible had capsized in the North
Sea with the loss of 123 lives. Public confidence in the safety of this relatively
new industry was shaken. Other drilling rigs were still operating offshore.
The public wanted to know without dela' why the Ocean Ranger had capsized
and sunk, why none of the crew had been saved and how other similar
disasters could be avoided.
3. THE INQUIRY
Both levels of government bad a very hot potato on their hands. Each
moved rapidly to establish royal commissions to investigate the loss and to
inquire into the safety of offshore drilling operations. In response to public
pressure, however, the two governments decided to amalgamate them and a
joint commission was set up in March 1982. The federal-provincial nature of
the Commission's constitution was unprecedented and it gave rise to some
unusual administrative problems. Its two-part mandate also provided an
unusual challenge.
The first part of the Commission's terms of reference was essentially a
judicial inquiry to establish the facts and to determine the cause of the disas-
ter; the second part called for an examination of the processes of the design
and construction of rigs, of the management of operations and of the nature of
regulations that directly or indirectly promotes the safety of drilling off
eastern Canada. The casualty investigation required the Commission to gather
extensive technical and other evidence which was then presented and
examined by counsel before the Commissioners at a formal quasi-judicial
3 Royal Commission on the Ocean Ranger Marine Disaster, Report One "The Loss of the
Semisubmersible Drill Rig Ocean Ranger and its crew" (Ottawa: Supply and Services
Canada, 1984) at iii.
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hearing. The inquiry into offshore safety required the Commission to
assemble a data base, to validate it and to seek advice and suggestions for
improvement from knowledgeable persons in government, industry and
universities.
4. ORGANIZATION
Following their decision to set up a joint commission, the governments
of Canada and Newfoundland then agreed to its terms of reference and entered
into a memorandum of understanding with respect to the principles that would
govern its administration and operations. The essence of this agreement was
that the two governments would approve its budget and share equally in the
costs of the Commission, but that it would operate on a single point budget
system in accordance with federal administrative and financial policies and
procedures. This meant in practice that, on all administrative and financial
matters, the Commission dealt directly with the Privy Council Office, which
in turn was responsible for dealing with the Newfoundland Department of
Justice in respect of matters covered by the memorandum of understanding.
During the initial six month period, however, communication between the two
governments with respect to the finances and operation of the Commission
was constrained by the political climate at that time and serious misgivings
were expressed by Newfoundland ministers about the manner in which the
Commission was perceived to be operating. In practice, the Commission
thereafter also kept the government of Newfoundland fully informed of its
financial position and of any changes made to its plan and schedule. It con-
tinued, nevertheless, to seek prior approval only from the government of
Canada, in accordance with the agreed procedure, for proposed actions and
expenditures.
When the two governments had agreed on the constitution of the
Commission, they then appointed the Chairman, the Vice-Chairman and the
four other Commissioners, three being nominated by each level of govern-
ment. The Chairman recommended for appointment the Commission Counsel
and, because of the scale of the inquiry, an Associate Counsel who temporari-
ly undertook the administrative aspects of setting up the Commission pending
the appointment of the Commission Secretary who was not appointed until the
beginning of June, three months after the establishment of the Commission
(see Figure 1). The Chief Technical Advisor to the Commission, a British
naval architect resident in the Isle of Man, was appointed in April. During
those first three months, an outline plan, a general schedule and a preliminary
overall budget estimate were prepared, and arrangements made through the
Department of Public Works for leasing space in a downtown commercial
office building to provide the facilities required by the Commission during its
projected three year life. The move out of temporary space was made in July
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and most of the department heads and key staff members were in place by
September. These were the Manager, Administration and Finance, the Head
of the Information Centre, the Editor (also responsible for Public Affairs),
three senior secretaries (to the Chairman, Commission Secretary and
Counsel), the accounting clerk and the supervisor of the word-processing sec-
tion. The Director of Studies, responsible for the Part Two study program,
joined the Commission part-time in January and full-time in April 1983,
followed shortly by the three study managers who reported to him.
FIGURE 1
Royal Commission of the Ocean Ranger Marine Disaster
Organization Chart - Part One Inquiry
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A commission's ability to meet its terms of reference in a competent and
professional manner depends to a great extent on the calibre of the staff it
attracts. Because a royal commission has a high profile, it can offer a
challenge, unusual experience and the prospect of an enhanced reputation to
those who work for it successfully in whatever capacity. These aspects would
have to be the major motivation for those who join its staff as the rates of
remuneration which a commission can offer are only marginally higher than
those paid routinely within government and less than the comparable levels of
remuneration in the private sector. Indeed, working for an inquiry is not on the
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career path for certain of the key people whose specialized experience, knowl-
edge and proven skills are urgently required if a commission is to meet its
objectives in a credible manner and within a reasonable time. For these
reasons it may prove necessary to bring such persons in through secondments
or through special contract arrangements when their services are required on a
full-time basis for an extended period, or in an advisory capacity if their
contribution can be made on a part-time basis. It proved possible to recruit
high quality staff for the Ocean Ranger Commission almost entirely from
within Newfoundland by means of advertising and by personal reference. The
cost and difficulty involved in bringing candidates in from other parts of the
country provided a strong incentive to canvass local sources. In the final
analysis, it was only necessary to recruit two individuals to the Commission's
staff from outside Newfoundland: one from Calgary and one from Ottawa,
since their specialties were not available within the province.
The Commission's Chief Technical Advisor, whose role was critical to
the effective conduct of the Commission's Part One investigation, did not re-
side in Newfoundland. The decision to appoint a resident of the United King-
dom to this important position was made on the recommendation of the
government of Canada and was prompted by his outstanding international
reputation as an expert witness in the field of marine loss investigations. In
that capacity, he was responsible for directing the Commission's technical
investigation and for advising the Commissioners and Commission Counsel
with respect to the technical evidence. Although the outcome of the Part One
investigation was successful and the technical work carried out for the
Commission was acknowledged to be of a high standard, the process of
achieving it was complicated by not having this key individual available in
person for consultation, except on an occasional basis. The difficulties that
were encountered, which led to delays and misunderstandings, would
undoubtedly have been ameliorated if the Chief Technical Advisor to the
Commission had been resident in Canada, preferably in Newfoundland, and if
the person who actually held that appointment had instead been retained in a
more clearly defined consultative capacity.
An important factor affecting the organization of this Royal Commission
was its location in St. John's, close to where the disaster occurred on which its
work was focussed but further away from Ottawa than any other major federal
commission had ever operated. This was a significant disadvantage during the
initial stage as the constraints of time and distance imposed practical limita-
tions on personal contact at the staff level between the Commission and fed-
eral officials in Ottawa just when the learning curve was at its steepest. A
deliberate emphasis by the Commission from the outset on the development of
a high quality communications system mitigated this problem substantially,
but never wholly removed it. Although the Commission recruited an adminis-
trative officer on secondment from the Department of Public Works'
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Newfoundland Regional Office during the initial phase, his lack of familiarity
with the Ottawa scene was a negative factor, notwithstanding the very positive
contribution that resulted from his excellent contacts at the local and Atlantic
Region levels.
Despite the effective support that was given by the Privy Council Office,
some of the Commission's problems during its first year would probably have
been substantially reduced if an administrative officer could have been found
who had some Ottawa experience in the federal systeni and a current connec-
tion. This became evident when the very successful arrangement was subse-
quently made to second a science procurement manager, from the Department
of Supply and Services' Science Centre in Hull, to manage the Commission's
contracting operations for its Part Two study program. Liaison visits were
made to Ottawa by Commission staff on a regular basis and, at the urging of
the Commission, return visits were made to St. John's from time to time by
officials from the Privy Council Office. These visits could, with advantage,
have been more frequent during the initial phase when Commission staff were
wrestling with innumerable start-up problems and too busy to leave the office.
There is no doubt that the decision to locate the Commission in St. John's
was a wise one. At the time of the loss and in the political climate that existed
then, it could hardly have been based anywhere else. Nevertheless, there were
some additional factors related to its location that affected the Commission's
operations. Travel in and out of Newfoundland is often unpredictable and the
work of the Commission was sometimes hampered in a way that would not
have occurred had it been based in central Canada. Also, as a result of its
composition, its constitution and its location, the Commission was perceived
by many to be a Newfoundland inquiry examining problems peculiar to
Newfoundland rather than a national investigation with internatinoal ramifica-
tions. This was the response received when the Commission informed the
government of Nova Scotia that it intended to conduct hearings in Halifax as
its mandate called for it to inquire into the safety of drilling operations off-
shore in eastern Canada. Notice was given, in Any event, of the Commission's
intention to hold final hearings in both Halifax and St. John's, if warranted by
the response received.
In the end, as a result of the broad scope of the Commission's consulta-
tive efforts, the international nature of the industry and the keen interest
shown from many quarters in the work of the Commission, these locational
difficulties were overcome. There is no doubt too that the increasing quality
and reliability of teleconferencing facilities and other communications
systems will progressively diminish disadvantages of location. Audio
teleconferencing was used to some extent by the Commission to cut down on
travel and consult rapidly, but an audio-visual teleconferencing system that
could be easily used by all participants would have made a major contribution
to the efficiency of the operation.
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5. SUPPORT SERVICES
The activities in which a royal commission must engage, the constraints
of time under which it must function and the pressure of public scrutiny under
which it must operate make it essential that the necessary support services
provided are of the highest quality. Information service is central to a commis-
sion's operations as it comprises the process of finding and acquiring, with the
minimum of delay, information which is accurate, current and relevant to the
requirements of commissioners, staff and consultants working for the
commission. It also comprises the design and maintenance of a system for
storing, searching and rapidly retrieving the commission's entire data base.
This need was met for the Ocean Ranger Inqiury through an online
computerized database, which was used to maintain a keyword index of the
verbatim transcripts of the evidence presented at the Part One hearings and of
submissions and reference material acquired during the second part of the
inquiry.
All commissions undertake studies, retain experts and use specialized
services of various kinds. Although they are allowed considerable latitude,
because of their authority to select and engage persons, commissions must
follow government procurement policies and procedures and display fiscal
responsibility. Because their operations are under close and often critical
observation, failure to do so may prove to be embarrassing and will in any
event cause delay. Procurement and contract administration, therefore, needs
to be conducted in a professional mannner. It is generally believed that
government procurement operations are very slow and inefficient. According-
ly, it is only natural that commissions usually seek to avoid delay by taking
the short-cut and dealing directly with the Treasury Board. Although this is
indeed the quickest way to proceed in certain instances, it can sometimes take
much longer than using the procedures and processes that govern the opera-
tions of the Department of Supply and Services. It was the experience of the
Ocean Ranger Commission that a Department of Supply and Services science
procurement manager seconded to the Commission's staff, but retaining his
Department of Supply and Services authority and status following their proce-
dures, could achieve rapid and satisfactory results. This same result could
have been achieved without a secondment, if the volume of contract work was
less, by a designated officer within the Department of Supply and Services to
provide the required service by assignment, so long as he worked closely with
commission staff.
It is probably a normal aspect of any royal commission that it is attempt-
ing to achieve a great deal in a very short time. This means that the office staff
have to be competent at their jobs, highly motivated and able to function with
minimum supervision. They should be backed up with the best available
word-processing, reprographic and communications equipment to assure
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maximum productivity. An efficient mail and messenger service is vital. A
well managed office will be supported by alert and sensitive personnel who
can recruit the right kind of staff and then look after them properly. This
objective entails working out a sensible way of operating within the Public
Service pay plan, administering salary policy carefully and learning how to
come to terms with the government personnel classification system in the
context of the special requirements and time horizon of a royal commission.
An effective finance and control system geared to the needs of the
commission is a vital support service. A commision must be able to ensure
that members of its staff are paid promptly and that its bills are settled expedi-
tiously. It has to prepare credible budget estimates, obtain funding approval,
record commitments, monitor expenditure and forecast actual costs at the end
of a period. Unless it can do these things, the commission cannot manage its
operations responsibly and it will lose credibility with its staff, within govern-
ment and with the public. Its activities are subject to annual audit and, if that
process reveals irregularities, the commission's reputation may be damaged.
It is in the area of financial procedures and cost control that a new organiza-
tion needs urgent help in the initial stage. A simple management information
system for monitoring and controlling costs must be put in place from the
outset. The standard federal government monthly cost report did not meet this
need in the case of the Ocean Ranger Inquiry, and probably still does not. A
commission perceived not to be in control of its expenditures is quickly
subjected to public criticism.
6. PUBLIC INFORMATION
All inquiries attract public interest and none more than those concerned
with disasters. Because of the intense regional public concern about the work
of the Ocean Ranger Commission and the nature of its mandate, it was essen-
tial to develop a good working relationship with representatives of the media
and to facilitate their task where possible of reporting the public hearings and
the progress of the investigation. A staff member with experience in this field
was appointed to act as spokesman on a routine basis, combining the role with
that of Editor. As the Chairman of the commission was a judge, he preferred
to have the Commission Secretary respond where controversial issues were
involved. The other Commissioners and members of the staff did not make
public statements on behalf of the Commission.
The Commission's terms of reference and the practice and procedure
rules for the hearings were printed and distributed to the media and interested
public. Press releases were issued to inform the public of new developments
in the Commission's work and formal statements were made by the Chairman
at regular intervals to report on the progress of the work and the status of the
inquiry. As the Commission was located in Newfoundland and dealing with
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the international oil industry, its work was carried out entirely in English.
Nevertheless, any material that was published formally was, of course, made
available in both official languages. Arrangements were also made to provide
simultaneous translation facilities at the hearings if required.
7. PART ONE PROCESS
The Commission faced a daunting task in the first part of its inquiry.
There were no survivors from the Ocean Ranger to give first-hand evidence
about the cause of the disaster. The wreck of the drillrig lay upside down on
the floor of the Grand Banks at a depth of 255 feet, with the superstructure
crushed into the seabed. The Commissioners decided
[T]hat the investigation of the loss of the Ocean Ranger and its crew should go
beyond the realm of acceptable conjecture or reasonable deduction based upon
circumstantial evidence. It should endeavour through scientific investigation to
determine why in fact the Ocean Ranger, alone of the three rigs on Hibernia,
capsized and sank during a severe winter storm.4
The decision to secure detailed technical evidence led to a major program of
technical investigation and study which was certainly one of the largest and
most complex of its kind ever undertaken in Canada.
One of the Commission's first actions was to award a contract for an
underwater examination of the rig. This difficult and hazardous operation
resulted in the successful recovery of portholes, the ballast control panel,
related electrical equipment and a great deal of technical data about the condi-
tion of the wreck. Extensive analysis of this data and testing of the equipment
recovered- during the dive was then undertaken, along with a comprehensive
program of model tests. These tests were carried out jointly by the National
Research Council of Canada in Ottawa and the Norwegian Hydrodynamic
Laboratories in Trondheim. As the Commission's report noted, this extensive
use of model-testing as an investigative tool to examine the behaviour of a
mobile offshore drilling unit was unprecedented. All the reports on the techni-
cal investigations undertaken were formally introduced as evidence at the
public hearings. The results of these studies, together with the evidence of
more than one hundred witnesses, enabled the Commission to reach conclu-
sions beyond reasonable doubt as to the causes of the loss of the rig and its
crew.
Although it would have been preferable to defer the commencement of
hearings until the investigation had been completed and all the evidence could
be presented coherently, it was not practicable to do so because of the intense
4 Ibid.
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public concern and interest in the inquiry. This was compounded by publicity
about the United States Coast Guard and the Natioial Transportation Safety
Board hearings held soon after the disaster, and a perception that these
agencies were already getting to the root of the problem. For this reason, the
Commissioners were understandably anxious to start the process expeditious-
ly and they decided to begin their hearings in late October 1982. The
Commission was, therefore, faced with the monumental task during that
summer and fall of assembling a staff team, setting up offices, agreeing on
and arranging for the diving operation and technical investigation to get
underway, interviewing potential witnesses, assembling documentary evid-
ence and planning the Part One public hearings. It was the responsibility of
the Commission Secretary to co-ordinate and administer these activities in
close consultation with the Commission Counsel.
Counsel to the Commission was responsible for assembling all the evi-
dence and for introducing it before the Commissioners at the public hearings.
He was assisted in the analysis of it by the Commission's Chief Technical
Advisor who directed the technical investigation. While this work progressed,
the organization of the hearings proceeded in parallel. Practical and Procedure
Rules for the Inquiry were drawn up and published. A notice was issued invit-
ing Applications for Standing. Suitable premises were identified at which to
conduct the public hearings and arrangements were negotiated for their use.
The nature of a commission's requirements for hearing facilities will de-
pend greatly on its mandate, but the process followed by most inquiries
involves some type of public hearing. These may be relatively brief and in a
variety of locations or they may be held in one place over a protracted period.
In the case of the Ocean Ranger Commission, the Part One hearings took 89
days spread over 17 months. It was necessary, therefore, to acquire the use of
a facility which was adequate for the Commission's purposes and which could
be controlled fully while in use. The kind of facility required was one that was
accessible, appropriate as the setting for an inqiury into a major disaster and
large enough to accommodate Commissioners and staff, witnesses, counsel
for the many interested parties, official observers, representatives of the
media and members of the general public. A large church hall was eventually
found that met these criteria and a lease was negotiated that reconciled the
Commission's unusual requirements with the operation of a multi-use commu-
nity facility.
Becasue of the technical nature of much of the evidence, the large
number of participants involved in the hearing process and the expectation
that it would be of long duration, a special video system was designed and
installed in the hall to permit the digplay, over a back-projection screen and
high-resolution television monitors, of documents, charts and maps, photo-
graphic material, film and video tapes. A high-quality audio system with an
integrated recording capability was also installed, together with carpeting and
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sound baffles to improve the acoustic properties of the hall. Radio journalists
were provided with a connection to this system so that they could record parts
of the proceedings themselves if they wished. The existence of a mezzanine
balcony in the hall allowed the Commission to permit television coverage of
the hearings while they were in progress without distracting the participants,
which also contributed to the excellent reporting of the hearings that occurred.
It was clear that the investment in these special systems was amply justified by
the increased efficiency of the proceedings and by the consequent saving in
time and overall cost.
8. ADVISORS
The nature of the disaster made it essential that the results of the inquiry
should have international credibility. Accordingly, it was recognized from the
outset that the Commission should seek the advice and help in its work of the
most knowledgeable and respected people in the fields in which its investiga-
tion was to be undertaken. This policy was followed during the Part One
investigation of the casualty in the selection of technical consultants and
expert witnesses. In planning the Part Two inquiry into safety offshore eastern
Canada, it was decided to undertake, initially, a program of state of the art
studies which would be carried out for the Commission by consultants. A
small group of advisors reviewed and validated the study plan. This initial
group was subsequently expanded into four advisory committees, composed
of individuals with particular expertise in the key fields covered by the
studies. These committees assisted in the selection of consultants, reviewed
the work done and suggested how best to arrange for it to be checked in-
dependently by reference to other recognized experts.
Once the initial work of these committees was completed, they became
inactive as groups, but individual members were consulted further as neces-
sary. In particuar, the chairmen of the four committees, each distinguished in
his field, and the Commission's Senior Advisor, a well-known Canadian
scientist with extensive international experience in the management of
research, worked very closely with Commissioners and staff in the develop-
ment of the final validation of this work. This was achieved through the
consultative process which took place during the course of half a dozen
seminars and a major international conference organized by the Commission
for the purpose. A number of advisors subsequently prepared draft material
which was used as a basis for chapters in the final report, as well as providing
constructive criticism during the process of reviewing the report in various
draft stages. Their participation in the work of the Commission enhanced the
quality of the end product and added greatly to its credibility. Through its
advisors, the Commission was able to reach and canvass the views of many
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influential persons who were, in the final analysis, in a position to respond to
the recommendations which it made.
9. PART TWO PROCESS
As previously noted, the Part One inquiry into the loss of the Ocean Ran-
ger was quasi-judicial in nature. Witnesses gave evidence on oath and were
examined by counsel in a formal setting before the Commissioners. The Part
Two inquiry into safety in eastern Canada offshore drilling operations called
for accurate, current information to be assembled about how those operations
were being conducted and for opinions and suggestions to determine whether
and how improvements should be introduced. Because of the complexity of
the Part One technical investigation and the consequent length of the hearings,
it became apparent fairly early on that it would be necessary to embark on the
Part Two inquiry before Part One had been concluded. This involved some
changes in attitude, mode and organization midway through a difficult
process. While the adversarial, legal procedures of the inquiry into the loss of
the Ocean Ranger were being pursued under the direction of Commission
Counsel, the information gathering, consultative process of the inquiry into
offshore safety was launched by the Commission's Director of Studies (see
Figure 2). These two streams of activity were in many ways complementary
and mutually supportive. They had to be closely co-ordinated and yet perce-
ived to be separate activities with somewhat different goals.
It was decided at the outset that the goal of the Part Two investigation
would be to identify practical means of improving the safety of offshore
operations. The prerequisite to achieving it would be to undertake the neces-
sary inquiry in such a way as to reassure informed opinion that the informa-
tion assembled was credible; steps would have to be taken to arrange for a
sufficiently wide range of views to be canvassed; and it would be essential to
ensure that the conclusions reached following investigation and consultation
were defensible and realistic. It was felt that recommendations based on such
conclusions were likely to be regarded as practical and to command respect.
The best way to be confident that information is credible is to make it
freely avaialble for examination and reaction. If it proves to be sound when
tested, then the material is strengthened by the process. Should inaccuracies
be identified, the Commission will have been warned. In the Part One inquiry,
the information on which the Commission based its findings (including the
results of studies and test programs undertaken for it) was all tested in this
way by being made public formally. as evidence which was then subject to
examination and challenge. In Part One, the issues were defined, the goal was
to arrive at the reasons and causes for the loss and the interests of the parties
directly concerned were clearly identified. The Part Two goal, of contributing
to improvement in the safety of offshore drilling operations, involved reach-
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ing conclusions about how to do things better. This was not a matter of fact
but of opinion. A consultative process was the approach most likely to yield
the highest common factor rather than the lowest common denominator. In
Part One, there were parties of interest with formal standing and the right to
be heard. In the Part Two inquiry, there were only interested parties defined as
being any party able to contribute to the consultative process or who may have
a direct and substantial interest in the recommendations of the Commission.
FIGURE 2
Royal Commission on the Ocean Ranger Marine Disaster
Organization Chart - Part Two Inquiry
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The information base for the Part Two inquiry and the Commission's
final report consisted of the Part One Report and the evidence given before the
Commissioners; the results of the Part Two study program; submissions
received from interested parties; and the results of the consultation process
related to each of these. The consultation process was perceived as being
progressive: private in the initial stages and eventually public. It began in
March 1983 with a small seminar of invited experts from government,
industry and universities. This group reviewed the draft Part Two Study Plan
and suggested the establishment of Advisory Committees to assist the
Commission with the implementation of this program.
This program was carried out by consultants and study teams to provide a
concise but comprehensive review of the state of the art in the main areas of
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concern. Twenty-four studies were undertaken over a two-year period in four
principal areas: environment, design, safety and training and regulations. The
views expressed and the conclusions reached in these study reports were those
of the authors. They represented input to, rather than the output of, the
Commission. As the draft study reports came in, they were subjected to an
internal review process. When a report containing an analysis of data and
conclusions was judged to be of an adequate standard, it was then sent for crit-
ical assessment to an external expert or experts of equal standing to the author
of the report. This peer review process was also applied to submissions
received from interested parties. It was at that stage, when all the studies and
submissions were complete and reviewed, that the Commission was ready to
begin public discussion of the subject matter covered by this material. In
accordance with the procedure already adopted for the Part One inquiry,
interested parties were then afforded access to all of the documents that were
relevant to such a discussion so that they could make an informed contribution
to it.
An inquiry of this nature always faces the problem of whether and when
to accept that the information gathered is sufficiently accurate, current and
comprehensive to form an acceptable basis for conclusions and recommenda-
tions. The world does not stand still to be sutdied and the very process of an
inquiry stimulates awareness of inadequacies and change. New practices are
introduced and sensible improvements are adopted while the inquiry is still
going on. A commission must keep this moving target in its sight and devise
the means for validating its data base in a convincing manner shortly before it
cuts off the study and consultative process and writes its final report. A
number of seminars were, therefore, held during this closing phase to focus
expert knowledge and opinion in several key fields and to update studies and
fill gaps in the data base. Arrangements were also made for final hearings
related to the safety of offshore drilling operations.
As this Part Two process was drawing to a conclusion, the Commission's
Part One Report was nearing completion. It had been apparent for some time,
due to the protracted nature of the Part One investigation, that these two
streams of work would come together at about the same time and that the
transition from Part One to Part Two would require skilful handling if anti-
climax was to be avoided. Commissions are normally wise to avoid interim
reports, however intense the pressure may be for some quick answers,
because of the risk of having them treated as a final product in spite of the
stated qualifications to the contrary. In the case of the Ocean Ranger Inquiry,
after a major investigation extending over a two-year period, it would have
been unacceptable to delay the Commission's report until the Part Two process
had also been completed. It was decided, therefore, to submit a report on the
Part One inquiry as soon as it was ready. The Commission could then switch
its whole attention to the Part Two inquiry and to its final report.
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It had become clear by the late fall of 1983 that the Part One Report was
unlikely to be ready for submission to government until the following
summer. Plans had to be made for public hearings for the Part Two inquiry and
the question to be resolved was what form these should take. The formal
hearings related to the loss of the drillrig and its crew eventually extended
over 17 months and were finally completed in late March 1984. Some way
had to be found to seek public consultation in Part Two that would highlight
the different process being followed and the non-adversarial nature of the
proceedings. Because of the specialized and technical nature of much of the
subject matter pertaining to the safety of offshore drilling operations, it was
clear that discussion of it would have to take place before the Commissioners
among knowledgeable persons qualified to assess and challenge the views of
other experts. A conference would provide a formal, but non-adversarial, set-
ting in which it would be possile to stimulate debate by experts on the basic
issues and questions which the Commission had to address and to illuminate
possible new directions and opportunities for improvement. Its purpose would
be to assess the information base and conclusions assembled for the Commis-
sion by its staff and to seek a broad consensus on the nature of any practical
suggestions offered to the Commission for improving the safety of offshore
drilling operations. After intensive discussion within the Commission, it was
decided that a logical extension of the peer review approach adopted for
validating the Part Two study reports would be to convene such an internation-
al consultative conference to consider, against the background of the Part One
findings, the conclusions reached in those reports, in the proceedings of the
seminars and in any submissions received.
Arrangements were made to hold the Conference on Safety Offshore
Eastern Canada at Memorial University of Newfoundland in mid-August
1984. The conference, scheduled to last for three days, was organized by a
small staff team working with the Commission Secretary. Co-ordination and
policy direction were provided by a conference organizing committee chaired
by the Vice-Chairman of the Commission. Representatives of the federal and
provincial governments, the offshore petroleum industry and the University
were members of this committee and contributed to the planning of the
conference. The Chairman of the Royal Commission and the Commission's
Senior Advisor acted jointly as General Chairmen of the Conference. Session
Chairmen were distinguished Canadians drawn from government, industry
and university. Keynote speakers were selected from among the leading inter-
national experts in the fields of environment and design, man/machine inter-
face, emergencies and the regulatory stystem. Each delegate was personally
asked by the Commission to participate in the Conference because of special
knowledge and experience in one or more of the key areas that affect safety
offshore eastern Canada and attendance was limited to approximately 200
persons from the world community concerned with the offshore oil and gas
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industry. The Commission's Director of Studies and his staff acted as
rapporteurs for all the sessions. They subsequently prepared the Conference
proceedings, circulated soon afterwards to all participants for comment,
which provided a very valuable reference and source of inspiration to the
Commission during the preparation of its final report.
As matters turned out, the Commission's first report was submitted to
government in mid-summer 1984 as planned and it was subsequently released
to the public just ahead of the Conference. The favourable reception accorded
the report, the publicity generated by its release and the availability to the
participants of the Commission's Part One conclusions and recommendations
ensured the success of the Conference. It had always been planned that the
Part Two inquiry would conclude with public hearings at which individuals
and public interest groups could make their views known to the Commission.
Hearings were scheduled to be held in Halifax and St. John's in the fall of
1984, but it became clear that all who wished to had already approached the
Commission to convey their views and it only proved necessary to hold one
final brief hearing in St. John's to complete the Part Two consultative process.
All that then remained was to write the final report.
10. THE REPORT
The report of a royal commission is its principal visible product, apart
from the studies undertaken for it, which may also be published. An attractive
and readable report is more likely to reach and influence the audience for
which it is intended than one which is poorly presented and written. Accord-
ingly, it is essential to devote attention and resources at an early stage to plan-
ning the report and to its design and production, recognizing that it is too late
to do so in the closing stages when the pressure of the schedule has become
intense.
A royal commission's report is submitted to the Governor-in-Council and
the format, mode and timing of its publication is a matter for government
decision. In practice though, the government will probably accept the
commission's reasonable recommendations with respect to publication and
delegate to it the responsibility for implementing them. Although the commis-
sion is reporting to and advising the government, what it has to say is likely to
be of interest to others who would be affected by its recommendations if they
were to be adopted.
A commission must therefore decide what kind of a report it intends to
write and who is likely to read it. In the case of the Ocean Ranger inquiry, it
was clear from the start that the report would be studied by a broad interna-
tional audience in government, industry and universities interested in, or
involved in, some aspect of the offshore petroleum industry. The report would
therefore need to be written in language to be understood easily by the general
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public, clearly presented, well illustrated and supported where necessary with
technical appendices to meet the needs of the more expert reader. A graphics
designer with a background in engineering and offshore operations was
retained to prepare a design guide for the report and to plan its eventual
production. This individual subsequently acted as production co-ordinator and
led the production team, which consisted of two editorial assistants and one
technical assistant.
The Commission Secretary had overall responsibility to the Commission
for the writing and production of the report. The Part One and Part Two
reports were different in content and style. Report One was a presentation of
factual evidence and of the Commission's findings, while Report Two presen-
ted an analysis of the processes affecting the safety of operations on which the
Commission based its conclusions and recommendations. In Part One, the
Editor and an assistant attended the hearings, prepared summaries of the evid-
ence and proceedings and, between sessions, began to write draft material to
be used as a basis for Report One. A preliminary table of contents was
approved by the Commission at an early stage of this work, which provided
the framework on which the first draft of the report was based. As working
draft chapters became available, the Commissioners received them for com-
ment and considered at Commission meetings the matters of significance in
them that required policy decisions. It was at this stage of the process that the
computerized data base maintained by the Commission's Information Centre
provided most valuable. As all the proceedings of the Commission at its
public hearings were indexed daily by keywords, verifying points of evidence
was quick and simple because of this system.
The final draft of Report One could not, however, be developed until the
Part One investigation and public hearings had been concluded. After this
occurred, it took a further three months to bring the text to the point at which
the Commissioners were prepared to give it their final approval. Throughout
this period, work was proceeding in parallel on the editing, production and
translation of approved material. Once the complete text had been approved,
the production team moved to Ottawa and worked closely with the Govern-
ment Printing Office to produce the report in final form. This was done by
early August 1984 and submitted to the governments. It was thus possible to
publish the English edition of the report just ahead of the Commission's off-
shore safety conference. The French edition, by special dispensation, was
published a month later.
In the preparation of Report Two, a number of individuals judged to be
highly competent, knowledgeable persons of recognized intellectual ability
were selected (mainly, though not exclusively, from among the Commission's
existing advisors) and, following a briefing meeting with all the Commissi-
oners, each was invited to prepare a working draft of a particular chapter.
When this draft had been completed and submitted for review, a further meet-
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ing took place at which the Commissioners discussed the draft, passed on
their comments and suggested how the draft might be amended. When the
revised working draft had been accepted, all further work on that chapter was
done within the Commission. One Commissioner was delegated the responsi-
bility for providing direction to the editorial group, which was composed of
Commission staff members who undertook the process of revising the
material through a series of further drafts and for approving the final draft on
behalf of the Commissioners.
The Director of Studies was responsible to the Commission Secretary for
assembling the data base and presenting the key issues for each section of the
report; for providing information and support to writers preparing drafts of
chapters and for critically reviewing the resulting material for accruacy and
validity; for developing and refining the Commission's final conclusions and
recommendations and for presenting them in a draft concluding chapter. He
also reviewed critically the summaries of seminar and workshop proceedings,
selected study reports, the conference proceedings and other supporting
material included in the final report, besides advising the Commission on the
content of the report. The Editor was responsible to the Commission Secretary
for liaison with the Commissioners regarding the content, nature and structure
of the report; for directing the editing of the text; for reviewing and preparing
illustrative material for production; for processing written material through
the various stages from word-processing to type-setting, mock-up, paste-up
and printing; for translation and processing for production of the French edi-
tion; and for co-ordination of the writing and production schedule.
Reports One and Two were, respectively, 400 and 300 pages long, and
the third and fourth volumes of the report, containing the report and seminar
summaries and the conference proceedi.ngs, added a further 400 pages of text.
This represented a significant publishing challenge and geography added a
special dimension. The material was all prepared in St. John's, translation was
done in Quebec City and the reports were printed in Ottawa. Text was mainly
transmitted electronically, except for the concluding chapters of each report
which were hand-carried. Proofs were exchanged and corrected via facsimile
transmission. The Commission's production co-ordination team worked in the
closest collaboration with the Government Printing Office from St. John's in
the early stages of each report and then from nearby temporary quarters in
Ottawa during the final stage of printing and binding.
11. CONCLUSION
It is acknowledged that in the gathering of information and views, a
commission may well prefer to stay at arm's length from the government
bureaucracy which is directly responsible for the subject matter of its inquiry.
The experience of the Ocean Ranger Commission, however, was that the co-
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ordinator appointed by the government to facilitate this process made a
significant contribution to the efficiency of the operation, ensured that the data
and views provided to the Commission had an official status and validation
and made certain that inter-and intra-departmental differences were reconciled
in advance. The relative openness of the information gathering process and
the procedures used to obtain an independent verification of the material
provided to the Commission ensured, so far as possible, that it was sound
even if there were differences in viewpoints about how it should be interpre-
ted.
A commission of inquiry is a race against time from start to finish and
there is very little opportunity to learn on the job as progression through each
of its stages provides fresh challenges of a different kind. The organizational
pattern and policy approaches adopted at the outset will probably persist,
therefore, throughout the life of the commission. As it is a relatively short-
term enterprise, the tendency will be to live with a problem rather than risk
change in the expectation of benefit which will accrue over time. For these
reasons, it is obviously preferable to start out right and it is, therefore, at the
outset that most good can be done in organizational and administrative terms.
It is in this respect that governments can probably help most by providing
sound and experienced support in the initial phase. This does not imply any
infringement on the independence of a commission, but assistance in
approaching a difficult task in a manner that will ensure a professional and
effective operation within the framework of government administrative and
financial policies and procedures that govern the activities of all commissions.
The more efficient and productive that operation is recognized to be, the more
credible the commission will be and the greater its eventual impact.
The role of the commission secretary is to orchestrate these diverse
activities, to ensure that the commissioners are provided with an efficient
organization able to provide them with sound advice and information on
which good decisions can be based, and to produce a professional report. The
way in which an inquiry is managed directly affects its credibility. The sole
purpose of a commission of inquiry is to reach credible findings and to make
recommendations to government which can form the basis for action to
resolve a problem or to formulate new public policy. It is the commission
secretary's responsibility to see that the commissioners are provided with the
means to achieve that objective.
